# Development of Type-2 Hypervisor for MIPS64 Based Systems

February 15

2014

[4th Deliverable]

This document is version 4 of first report and includes the implementation details of current deliverable of "Development of Type 2 Hypervisor for MIPS64 based Systems" project, funded by National ICT R & D Fund Pakistan. The report starts with brief description of project objectives, technical details of our approach, challenges and their solutions. Complete description of testing infrastructure, test cases and test results are discussed later on. The report concludes with the impact of current deliverable on the overall project progress. Test Cases Result Report







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## 1. Project Description

The main objective of this project is to develop an open source Type-2 hypervisor, for Linux-based MIPS64 embedded devices. Type-2 means that it is a hosted hypervisor which runs on MIPS64 based Linux systems as a Linux process. It is intended that the hypervisor will (1) support installation and execution of un-modified MIPS64 Linux guest(s) on un-modified MIPS64 Linux host (2) take advantage of virtualization for improved hardware utilization and performance optimization, by using multiple MIPS cores. Our focus on MIPS is due to the fact that MIPS based systems are lagging behind in the use of virtualization. One of the reasons is that many MIPS based processors are used in low end consumer devices like TV set top box, GPS navigation system and printers. There isn't a clear cut use case for virtualization here. But few of the MIPS vendors target higher end embedded devices like network switches and routers, GSM/LTE base station equipment and MIPS based blade servers. There are clear-cut virtualization use cases for this higher-end MIPS segment.

The development started on April 1, 2013 and first deliverable was due after 3.5 months i.e. July 15, 2013. In first deliverable, we built the required infrastructure. The infrastructure printed guest kernel banner on console at the end of  $1^{st}$  deliverable. Second deliverable was due after 6.5 months of commencement data i.e. October 15, 2013. The milestone in 2nd deliverable was the dynamic code patching of one sensitive guest instruction with one safer instruction. In 3rd deliverable, dynamic code patching is augmented by implementing cases where one sensitive instruction is replaced by more than one instruction. In 4<sup>th</sup> deliverable, dynamic code patching is applied on demand.

### 2.High Level Design

Type-2 hypervisor behaves like an ordinary Linux process that could be scheduled by host operating system. However, this process has to present a holistic view of virtual hardware for guest operating system(s) to run on it. Virtual hardware consists of software representations of CPU cores, memory and peripheral devices. In real hardware, CPU cores and devices work concurrently and could be considered as processes or threads in software representation. Multiprocessing requires inter-process communication (IPC) whereas multithreading could be implemented using the shared address space. Each one has its own pros and cons. We selected multithreaded design for our hypervisor, as shown in Figure 1. It shows that each core and device is a separate thread. Central interrupt unit (CIU) is another thread that dispatches pending interrupts to the cores using mapped memory.



Figure 1: Multithreaded Design of Type-2 hypervisor.

# 3. Development Strategy

We are following a hybrid approach to develop the hypervisor. Executable binary is loaded in the address space of hypervisor and mapped to a known memory address. Traditional trap-and-emulate technique is used to take control of each instruction. Hybrid approach works as following:

1. If the instruction is privileged, it is emulated.

2. If the instruction manipulates  ${\rm sp}$ ,  ${\rm gp}$  and/or  ${\rm k0}$  registers, it is dynamically patched before execution.

3. Otherwise, the instruction is executed directly on hardware as it is.

# 4. Challenges and Solutions

Development of a hypervisor is quite challenging. Runtime systems like hypervisor are typically sensitive to runtime overhead. Runtime overheads, like that of emulation, result in significant performance degradation if not taken care of. To reduce runtime overhead, our initial strategy was to emulate privileged instructions only and execute rest of the instructions on bare metal (hardware). On execution of privileged instruction in user mode, a trap is generated (i.e. SIGILL signal is raised). We implemented a signal handler that catches signal, fetch/decode the instruction and emulate its behavior.

#### Challenge 1

Standard C/C++ libraries (e.g. glibc) do not allow modification of sp (\$29) and gp (\$28) registers in user mode. Non-privileged instructions dealing with these registers can't be executed directly on hardware. Similarly, K0 (\$26) and K1 (\$27) registers produce unexpected results because they are interrupt handling registers used by kernel and potentially not used by user programs.

#### Solution 1

In addition to emulation of privileged instructions, we implemented the code for emulation of non-privileged instructions involving gp and sp register.

#### Challenge 2

The next challenge was that any instruction can potentially manipulate  ${\rm gp}$  and  ${\rm sp}$  registers and we may end up in emulating all instructions, resulting in poor performance.

#### Solution 2

We implemented code for dynamic code patching and patched all instructions involving sp(\$29), gp(\$28) and k1(\$27) registers. Patched instructions were harmlessly executed on hardware and contents of corresponding registers were updated later (in a trap handler).

#### Challenge 3

To ensure correct execution of guest code, we need to use debugger extensively during development. With the increasing number of executed instructions, debugging information becomes complex and hard to read. In case of an error condition, we need to determine the instruction that produced error. Searching the error-causing instruction between two states of emulator is not a trivial task.

#### Solution 3

In this stage, we generate trap on every instruction so that debugging and testing could be made easier. Now, the guest code is executed using a hybrid approach: privileged instructions are emulated, instructions involving sp, gp, k0 registers are patched and the rest are allowed to execute on hardware unchanged.

#### Challenge 4

Instruction-by-instruction execution requires trap at each instruction e.g. for TLB checking. This leads to poor performance of virtual machines. Modify-compile-run cycle also leads to significant delays in development of hypervisor.

#### Solution 4

We sought solution of this problem by executing a block of instructions at a time. The block is fetched from the executable binary and translated to a new block of safer instructions. The instruction for which a trap is necessary is patched with harmless instructions on demand. In this way, a translated block is safe to execute on bare metal without worrying about TLB checking sort of stuff. Potentially a trap is generated at the end of a block execution instead of each instruction of the block. Overall work flow of block level translation is shown in Figure 2. Logging and testing mechanism is optionally pluggable and shown with dashed lines to distinguish from the rest.

# 5. Testing Infrastructure

Testing infrastructure involves MIPS64 evaluation board with multicore Octeon processor, hardware debugger (JTAG), development system and testing routines. We need rigorous testing to make sure that guest kernels run in complete



Figure 2. Dynamic Binary Translation Mechanism for MIPS64 VMs.

isolation from each other and from host kernel. Similarly, on each instruction execution in virtualized environment, changes to system state should imitate the changes made by executing the same in real environment.

## 5.1.Test Cases

Hypervisor manipulates (i.e. emulation/code patching) guest code to use privileged hardware resources controlled by host kernel. Hence, various test cases are needed to make sure the consistency and integrity of guest code. Up to current deliverable, our focus is on the test cases discussed in following subsections.

### 5.1.1. Matching system states

In our case, system state consists of the values of general purpose registers and some of coprocessor 0 (CP0) registers at a particular instance. In order to verify the correct working of hypervisor, we run (same) executable binary directly on Cavium MIPS64 board and through hypervisor. We get real system state on each privileged instruction by using JTAG and compare both outputs (hypervisor and JTAG) for verification. JTAG provides the facility of setting hardware breakpoints at each privileged instruction to stop and take log of system state. Without setting breakpoints, it logs the state at every instruction execution.

# 5.1.2. Execution path

Due to emulation and code patching, guest code execution path may differ from that of the same binary running directly on board. Taking Log at breakpoints may fail due to unavailability of a priori information about execution path of guest code. For example, if guest code sway from the path containing some breakpoint, we would not be able to take system state at that breakpoint and state matching test result will be misleading.

Logging system state after each instruction execution could help in avoiding the situation of taking wrong execution path. This allows us to debug the potential causes of error (if any) by looking at system state before and after the execution of malfunctioning instruction. However, there is inherent overhead of logging state at each instruction execution. There were about 339351 instructions executed by u-boot. JTAG created a file of about 6MB in approximately 7 hours. Generated file contains data (i.e. general purpose registers + CP0 registers content) of about 2600 states. To reduce state logging time, we decided to use a small binary (i.e. code for irrelevant external devices is commented out) and take log on Quick Emulator (QEMU). To take log on QEMU, we used the expertise of another HPCNL team working on a different project titled "System Mode Emulation in QEMU".

### 5.1.3. Comparing Console Output

On reaching the stage where console is get attached with our hypervisor, the binaries, executing within hypervisor, starts emitting messages on console. It serves as another way of validation, whereby output of our hypervisor is compared with that of real MIPS system.

### 5.1.4. Progress

The progress is tracked by identifying labeled blocks, in binary code. The blocks are identified by following the control flow of binary. When the instructions in one block are executed, its label is noted and control is conditionally/unconditionally transferred to the next block in control flow. This way we measure the progress that how many blocks have been executed and how many left.

Emulation and code patching may lead to infinite loops in the code. For example, if emulation/patching changes system state in such a way that control is transferred to one of prior blocks of the current block, the hypervisor will enter into an infinite loop. We need to avoid the situations like this in order to make progress.

### 5.2. Memory Management Unit (MMU)

The purpose of memory management unit is to translate virtual addresses to physical addresses. For virtual address translation, some rules are already defined by physical hardware and we implemented these rules in software to provide the virtualization of MMU used by guest operating system(s). In case of hypervisor, it is used to translate guest virtual address (GVA) to host virtual address (HVA). To translate GVA to guest physical address (GPA), we use same method as used by the hardware. For translation of GPA to HVA, we use hashmap to store information of all regions mapped in host virtual address space.

### 5.2.1. GVA to GPA Translation

MIPS64 architecture supports both 32-bit and 64-bit Addressing modes. In 32bit addressing mode, address segment is defined by upper 3 bits (i.e. bits 32-29) of virtual address. If these bits are 100 then it is kseg0 region. It is directly mapped to physical memory. If these bits are 101, address is from kseg1 region and this is also directly mapped to physical memory. In both previous cases, lower 20 bits represent physical address. For 110, region is ksseg. This is not directly mapped and we have to search for it in TLB for address translation. For 111, region is kseg3 which is not directly mapped and we have to search TLB for valid entry to translate the address. If these bits are 0xx then it is useg. Translation for useg is slightly different. If ERL bit of status register of CP0 is set then useg is directly mapped to physical memory. If ERL bit is not set then we have to check TLB to get physical address.

In 64-bit addressing mode, address segment is defined by upper 2 bits (i.e. bits 63-62) of virtual address. If these bits are 10, then this is xkphys region which is directly mapped to physical memory or I/O devices. If 49<sup>th</sup> bit of virtual address is 0 then it is memory access and lower 29 bits represent physical address of memory. If 49<sup>th</sup> bit is 1 then it is I/O address and data is load/store from respective device. If these bits are 11 then it is xkseg region which isn't directly mapped and we have to search TLB for valid address translation. For 01, region is xsseg which is also to be searched in TLB for translation. For 00, region is xuseg. If ERL bit of status register of CPO is set then it is directly mapped otherwise TLB translation would be required.

#### 5.2.2. GPA to HVA Translation

All physical memory regions of a machine are mapped in virtual address space of hypervisor. Once we get the valid translation for GVA, we have to translate that physical address to HVA in order to access valid data. After getting valid physical address, we found the memory region or I/O device to which it belongs. We simply find HVA for required memory region or I/O device using hashmap. Once we get a valid GVA-to-HVA translation, we can simply execute the respective instruction.

#### 5.2.3. Page Table

In MIPS no physical page table is provided by hardware and page table is solely managed by operating system. Hence, there is no need to implement page table.

# 5.2.4. Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)

TLB is a cache used to speedup virtual address to physical address translation. In case of type 2 hypervisor, TLB translates GVA to HVA. There

are four basic TLB functions: probe, read, write-random and write-index. TLB probe searches for a TLB entry using the value of EntryHi register of co-processor 0 (CP0). If valid entry is found, it places index of TLB entry in CP0 index register, otherwise it sets probe bit of index register and consult page table. TLB read gets value from CP0 index register and checks the validity of data at this index. If data is valid, the components of entry moved entryHi, entryLo0, entryLo1 and page-mask) are (i.e. to corresponding CP0 registers. Otherwise TLB read raises invalid data exception. TLB write-random gets index of TLB entry from CP0 random register and checks the validity of data at the index. If entry is dirty, it raises dirty data exception, otherwise it writes corresponding values of CP0 registers (i.e. entryHi, entryLo0, entryLo1 and page-mask) to the TLB entry at that index. TLB write-index works same as TLB write-random except that it gets index value from CP0 Index register.

On TLB miss, page table functions are called and GVA is searched in the page table. If found, corresponding HVA is returned, otherwise a new memory region is allocated using mmap() and its address is returned. Current implementation does not impose any restriction on memory allocation (i.e. it will be implemented in future deliverables). To reclaim guest memory, one possible solution is to use OOM killer of guest kernel.

# 5.3.Central Interrupt Unit (CIU)

CIU is responsible for dispatching interrupt requests (coming) from external devices to a particular core. CIU is discussed here in context of our test bed i.e. Cavium Networks OCTEON Plus CN57XX evaluation board [1]. CIU distributes a total of 37 interrupts i.e. 3 per core plus 1 for PCIe. Three interrupts for each core set/unset bit 10, 11, 12 of Cause register of the core. Using these cause register bits, interrupt handler of a core could prioritize different interrupts. Interrupt requests from external devices are accumulated in 72-bit а summary vectors with naming convention CIU INT<core#> SUM<0|1|4>. Summarized interrupts reach to their ultimate destination by using corresponding 72 bits interrupt enable vector with naming convention CIU\_INT<core#> EN<0|1> and CIU INT<core#> EN4 <0|1>. Interaction of CIU, external devices and cores is shown in Figure 3 (a). CIU reads memory mapped registers of the external devices to know about pending interrupt requests and sets corresponding bits of cause register of target core. Figure 3 (b) shows a simplest description of the internal working of CIU, where interrupt identification/handling is done in software.

We have implemented a simplest abstraction of CIU. It has been integrated in a copy of main hypervisor code and works as a separate thread (see Figure 1). CIU is only reading CPO's cause register. As UART is not fully developed yet, UART's memory mapped registers are artificial (for the time being). UART



(b)

Figure 3: Central Interrupt Unit. (a) Interrupt distribution from external devices to core. (b) Internal working of CIU. Inward arrow comes from external devices and outward arrow goes to all cores.

writing and other devices would be implemented in future. CIU itself has set of summary and enable registers for every core. An interrupt request goes to only those cores that had enabled the interrupt by configuring its enable register. In current code, CIU reads UART's Interrupt Identification Register (IIR), extracts identity bits and set/clear the corresponding summary registers bits. These summary registers for every core are than "AND" with their enable registers to set or clear cause register's bit 10, 11 and 12.

In integrated code, shared memory regions are defined for CIU to work with other components of virtual board (see Figure 1). Figure 4 shows these shared memory regions for core0, CIU and a single device i.e. UART. Region overlapping and dotted lines represent the accessibility and access mode of registers, respectively. For example, CP0 Cause register belongs to core0, CIU can access it but UART cannot. As Cause register belongs to core0, it can be read-written by core0 but it is read-only for CIU. IIR register of UART is read-only for CIU and Core0, hence it is at the intersection of three regions and have dotted boundary. CIU's summary registers are read-only for core0, hence dotted and at the intersection of two regions. As CIU's enable register is readable and writeable for core0 and CIU, it has solid boundary and lies in overlapped region.

### 5.4.Test Results

The sample output of system state test, execution path test, TLB, page table, CIU and hypervisor console is elaborated in this section.



Figure 4: Memory mapping between Core and external devices.

# 5.4.1. Output of System State Matching Test

We trap at every instruction to create a state-file. This state-file is matched with QEMU log state-file to see if any register contains different contents. Mismatches are written in other file as shown in Figure 5.

### 5.4.2. Output of Execution Path Test

We face difficulties in debugging if QEMU log is missing instruction log at different points. To ensure that the hypervisor is on the right track we match the Program Counter (PC) values taken by hypervisor and all the PC values taken in QEMU log, as shown in Figure 6.

### 5.4.3. Output of TLB Testing

To test TLB mechanism, random TLB entries are generated and searched in TLB. A TLB miss is obvious because the entry is newly generated. Hence, probe bit is set and TLB write-random function is called to place this entry at the index present in CPO random register. Random register is incremented and entry is searched again. On TLB hit, we call TLB read to fetch the entry from the index set by TLB probe, as shown in Figure 7.

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Output_file.txt ×			
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PC_E=0xffffffffc002700c		PC_0=0xffffffffc002700	Эc
GP_Regs:			
0x000000000000000000000000000000000000	**	0×000000000000000000	R1:
0xfffffffffffffff	==	0xfffffffffffffff	R2:
0xffffffffc005b7c0	**	0xffffffffc005b8a8	R3:
0xffffffffffffff	==	0xfffffffffffffff	R4:
0x0000000000000003	**	0x00000000000000020	R5:
0xffffffffc005b7c8	**	0xfffffffc005b8b0	R6:
0xffffffffc005b7b0	==	0xffffffffc005b7b0	R7:
0xffffffffc00c2020	**	0xfffffffc00c2050	R8:
0x0000000000000005	**	0x0000000000000022	R9:
0x0000000000000000	==	0×00000000000000000	R10:
0xffffffffc005b7b0	==	0xfffffffc005b7b0	R11:
0x0000000000000000	==	0x00000000000000000	R12:
0xffffffffc0059a10	==	0xffffffffc0059a10	R13:
0x0000000000000020	==	0x0000000000000020	R14:
0×0000000000000000	==	0×00000000000000000	R15:
0x000000000000002c	**	0x000000000000000f8	R16:
0xffffffffc00c2020	**	0xfffffffc00c2050	R17:
0x000000000000001c	**	0×00000000000000000	R18:
0xffffffffc00d9fb8	**	0×000000000000000001	R19:
0×0000000000000018	**	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000	R20:
0xffffffffc00d9ef8	**	0xffffffffc00d5cf0	R21:
0x000000041ffd5ee0	**	0×00000000000000000	R22:
0×000000000080000	==	0×000000000080000	R23:
0xffffffffc005c0a0	==	0xfffffffc005c0a0	R24:
0xffffffffc0026c8c	==	0xfffffffc0026c8c	R25:
0xffffffffc00d9ef8	==	0xffffffffc00d9ef8	R26:

Figure 5: Output of system state matching test.

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40	c000ae64	matched				
41	c000ae68	matched				
42	c000ae6c	matched				
43	c000ae70	matched				
44	c000ae74	matched				
45	c000ae78	matched				
46	c000ae7c	matched				
47	c000ae80	matched				
48	c000ae84	matched				
49	c000ae88	matched				
50	c000ae8c	matched				
51	c000ae90	matched				
52	c000ae94	matched				
53	c000ae98	matched				
54	c000ae9c	matched				
55	coooaeao	matched				
56	c000aea4	matched				
5/	c000aea8	matched				
58	coooaeac	matched				
59	coooaebo	matched				
60	c000aeb4	matched				
01	coooaeba	matched				
62	coooaebc	matched				
60	c000aec0	matched				
65	c000aec4	matched				
66	coodaeca	matched				
67	hypervise	pr c000aed0	mismatched	qemu p	oc c000b07	74

Figure 6: Output of Execution Path Test.

Then TLB write-index function is called that writes TLB entry at the index present in index register. As index register was set by TLB probe, it writes the entry at same index that was previously written by TLB write-random. TLB probe and TLB read are called again and then a new random entry is generated. This process is repeated 640 times.

As TLB could have 64 entries at max, additional entries require a replacement policy. After setting all entries, TLB entries are printed, as shown in Figure 8. To test page table, a random GVA is generated and searched in the page table. Obviously, there is no matching entry in page table because this is the newly generated address. Hence, it maps a new memory region and returns its address. This process is repeated several times. Each time it maps a new region, places translation in page table and returns translated address. The output is shown in Figure 9 (a). After creating appropriate entries in page table, same process is repeated again for all the generated addresses and we get valid translation now, as shown in Figure 9 (b). Then whole page table is printed in Figure 9 (c) and reverse page table, shown in Figure 9 (d), is also managed to use for future testing of hypervisor.

File Edit View Search Terminal Help octeon:/home/kics/Usama Data/VExecutor# ./dist/Debug/MIPS64-Linux-x86/vexecutor Wired value is 0. tlbr=>Entry not found tlbwr=>TLB Written: At index 63, Random: 63 tlbp:TLB found entry:63 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 63, Random: 63 Valid:TLB Invalid exception handling tlbwi=>TLB Written: At index 63, Random: 63 tlbp:TLB found entry:63 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 63, Random: 63 Valid:TLB\_Invalid exception handling \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* tlbr=>Entry not found tlbwr=>TLB Written: At index 63, Random: 0 tlbp:TLB found entry:0 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 0, Random: 0 Valid:TLB Invalid exception handling tlbwi=>TLB Written: At index 0, Random: 0 tlbp:TLB found entry:0 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 0, Random: 0 Valid:TLB Invalid exception handling tlbr=>Entry not found tlbwr=>TLB Written: At index 63, Random: 1 tlbp:TLB found entry:1 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 1, Random: 1 Valid:TLB Invalid exception handling tlbwi=>TLB Written: At index 1, Random: 1 tlbp:TLB found entry:1 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 1, Random: 1 Valid:TLB\_Invalid exception handling tlbr=>Entry not found tlbwr=>TLB Written: At index 63, Random: 2 tlbp:TLB found entry:2 tlbr=>TLB read: At index 2, Random: 2 Valid:TLB Invalid exception handling

Figure 7: Searching for random TLB entry.

# 5.4.4. Output of CIU Testing

Artificial UART registers are read to test the code. UART registers were set to see the effect on the 10, 11 and 12 bits of cause register. If Interrupt ID (IID) field of IIR is 1 than there is no pending interrupt request. Otherwise, it represents the ID of pending interrupt. In actual system enable register is set by the system but here we are setting it explicitly. The cause register is initialized with garbage value every time because CIU will only change the 9, 10 and 11 bits of cause register.

In source code of Figure 10, mio\_uart0 IIR register is set to 6 to show that "Receiver line status" interrupt is present. Similarly, mio\_uart1 IIR register is set to 1 to represent no interrupt. Only core0's enable register is set. And all the other cores have disabled the hardware interrupts. Output

File	Edit	View	Search	Terminal	Hel	.p		
Мар	size .	is 64						
####	#####	#####	#######	#######	####	###########	#######################################	
Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018a489		EntryHi :	0x0000000001be8fe1	
Entr	yLo0:	0x00(	0000000	5b9b6b0		EntryLo1:	0x000000000cdce8b0	
Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018a961		EntrvHi :	0x0000000001bf03df	
Entr	vl o0:	0x000	0000000	5bbd030		Entryl o1:	0x000000000ce20430	
	,200.	0.000		000000				
Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018ae39		EntryHi :	0x0000000001bf87dd	
Entr	yLo0:	0x000	0000000	5bde9b0		EntryLo1:	0x000000000ce71fb0	
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Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018b311		EntryHi :	0x0000000001c00bdb	
Entr	yLo0:	0x00(	0000000	5c00330		EntryLo1:	0x000000000cec3b30	
Dado	mack·	0×000	000000	0186709		EntryHi ·	Avananananan castda	
Entr	vi o0.	0×000	0000000	5c21cb0		Entrylo1:	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000	
- ne i	y200.	0.000	0000000	0021000		EntryLor.	0,0000000000000000000000000000000000000	
Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018bcc1		EntryHi :	0x0000000001c123d7	
Entr	yLo0:	0x000	0000000	5c43630		EntryLo1:	0x000000000cf67230	
2								
Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018c199		EntryHi :	0x0000000001c1a7d5	
Entr	yLo0:	0x000	0000000	5c64fb0		EntryLo1:	0x000000000cfb8db0	
Dere	maalia	0.000	000000	010-671			0-000000001-225-42	
Page	mask:	0x000		01800/1		EntryH1 :	0x0000000001c22bd3	
Entr	yL00:	00000	0000000	2080930		EntryLoI:	0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000	
Page	mask:	0×000	0000000	018cb49		EntrvHi :	0x0000000001c2afd1	
Entr	vLo0:	0x000	0000000	5ca82b0		EntryLo1:	0x0000000000d05c4b0	
	,							
Page	mask:	0x000	0000000	018d021		EntryHi :	0x0000000001c323cf	
Entr	yLo0:	0x000	0000000	5cc9c30		EntryLo1:	0x000000000d0ae030	
8 32	2012 201	1957.02.03		9886 - 98988		2011 NSM		
Page	mask:	0×000	0000000	018d4f9		EntryHi :	0x0000000001c3a7cd	
Entr	yLo0:	0x00(	0000000	5ceb5b0		EntryLo1:	0x00000000000ffbb0	
Dago	mack	0~000	0000000	0104041		EntryHi ·	0×0000000001c42bcb	
Entr	vi of.	0x000		5d0cf30		Entry of:	0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000	
LITEL	y200.	0,000		5400150		cherycor.	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000	

#### Figure 8: TLB entries in TLB table.

for core 0 in Figure 10 shows that initially cause register is initialized by a garbage value.

The summary register's 34<sup>th</sup> bit (uart 0) is set, making it 40000000. Corresponding 34<sup>th</sup> bit in enable register is also set, which means that the 9<sup>th</sup> bit of cause will be set. The enable register for 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> bit are zero, so cause bits would be cleared. Initially the xxxxxx6ac8 is changed to xxxxxx66c8 by setting 9<sup>th</sup> bit and clearing 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> bit. For core 1, as none of the enable registers are configured so three bits would be cleared i.e. xxxxxx6770 changes to xxxxxx6370.

In Figure 11, uart0 has no interrupt and uart1 is receiving an interrupt with id 6. For core0, bit 9 and 10 of enable register is set and cause register is get initialized with garbage value. As summary register shows the presence of an interrupt and bit 35 is set, it means that uart1 interrupt is present. Its enable register should also be set for uart1, in order to pass on the pending interrupt. Hence, bit 9 and 11 will be cleared and bit 10 will be set for core 0 i.e. xxxxxxxdac8 changes to xxxxxxxcac8 in the output.

File Edit View Search Terminal Help	File Edit View Search Terminal Help
map size is 0	********************
Map not found.	Map found.
Mapping memory region.	Guest VA: 00000016f1a2e000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a26000
Guest VA: 00000016f1a2e000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a26000	#######################################
#######################################	Map found.
Map not found.	Guest VA: 00000016f1d90000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a25000
Mapping memory region.	#######################################
Guest VA: 00000016f1d90000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a25000	Map found.
*****	Guest VA: 00000016f20f3000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a24000
Map not found.	**********
Mapping memory region.	Map found.
Guest VA: 00000016f20f3000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a24000	Guest VA: 00000016f2455000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a23000
#######################################	*****
Map not found.	Map found.
Mapping memory region.	Guest VA: 00000016f27b8000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a22000
Guest VA: 00000016f2455000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a23000	*******
#######################################	Map found.
Map not found.	Guest VA: 00000016f2b1a000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a21000
Mapping memory region.	**************
Guest VA: 00000016f27b8000 Host VA: 00007f19f9a22000	Map found.

(a)

(b)

File Edit View Search Terminal	Help	File Edit View Search Terminal	Help
Table man ic:		Guest VA: 00000016f7fb6000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0300
Habte Map is:		Guest VA: 00000016f8318000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0200
Cupet VA: 00000016f1-20000	Uset VA, 00007f10f0s26000	Map size is 32.	
Guest VA: 0000001611420000	Host VA: 0000711919826000	Reverse map entries are :	
Guest VA: 0000001611090000	Host VA: 0000711919825000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a02000	Guest VA: 00000016f83180
Guest VA: 0000001612013000	Host VA: 0000711919424000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a03000	Guest VA: 00000016f7fb60
Guest VA: 0000001612455000	Host VA: 0000711919823000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a04000	Guest VA: 00000016f7c540
Guest VA: 0000001012/08000	Host VA: 0000711919822000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a05000	Guest VA: 00000016f78f10
Guest VA: 0000001012010000	Host VA: 0000711919821000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0b000	Guest VA: 00000016f758f0
Guest VA: 00000010120/0000	Host VA: 0000711919420000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0c000	Guest VA: 00000016f722c0
Guest VA: 0000001613101000	Host VA: 0000711919411000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0d000	Guest VA: 00000016f6eca0
Guest VA: 0000001013341000	Host VA: 0000711919410000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0e000	Guest VA: 00000016f6b680
Guest VA: 0000001013884000	Host VA: 0000711919810000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0f000	Guest VA: 00000016f68050
Guest VA: 0000001013000000	Host VA: 0000711919410000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a10000	Guest VA: 00000016f64a30
Guest VA: 0000001015108000	Host VA: 0000711919810000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a11000	Guest VA: 00000016f61400
Guest VA: 0000001014200000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a10000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a12000	Guest VA: 00000016f5dde0
Guest VA: 0000001014020000	Host VA: 0000711919419000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a13000	Guest VA: 00000016f5a7c0
Guest VA: 0000001614550000	Host VA: 0000711919410000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a14000	Guest VA: 00000016f57190
Guest VA: 0000001615054000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a16000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a15000	Guest VA: 00000010157150
Guest VA: 0000001615357000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a15000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a16000	Guest VA: 00000016f50540
Guest VA: 00000016f5719000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a14000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a17000	Guest VA: 00000016f4cf20
Guest VA: 00000016f5a7c000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a13000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a18000	Guest VA: 00000010140120
Guest VA: 00000016f5dde000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a12000	Host VA: 00007f10f0a10000	Guest VA: 00000010140000
Guest VA: 00000016f6140000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a11000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a1a000	Guest VA: 00000010140200
Guest VA: 00000016f64a3000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a10000	Host VA: 00007f10f0a1b000	Guest VA: 00000010142000
Guest VA: 00000016f6805000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0f000	Host VA: 0000771979410000	Guest VA: 00000010131080
Guest VA: 00000016f6b68000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0e000	Host VA: 0000711919410000	Guest VA: 00000010150000
Guest VA: 00000016f6eca000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0d000	Host VA: 0000711919410000	Guest VA: 000000101388440
Guest VA: 00000016f722c000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0c000	Host VA: 0000711919416000	Guest VA: 00000010133410
Guest VA: 00000016f758f000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a0b000	Host VA: 0000711919411000	Guest VA: 00000010151010
Guest VA: 00000016f78f1000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a05000	Host VA: 0000711919420000	Guest VA: 00000010120/00
Guest VA: 00000016f7c54000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a04000	Host VA: 0000711919421000	Guest VA: 00000010120100
Guest VA: 00000016f7fb6000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a03000	Host VA: 0000711919422000	Guest VA: 0000001672/080
Guest VA: 00000016f8318000	Host VA: 00007f19f9a02000	Host VA: 0000711919823000	Guest VA: 00000010124550
Map size is 32.		Host VA: 0000711919424000	Guest VA: 00000016720730
Reverse map entries are :		Hest VA: 0000711919825000	Guest VA: 00000016f10900
Host VA: 00007f19f9a02000	Guest VA: 00000016f8318000	Mon oizo io 22	Guest VA: 00000016Tla2e0
		map Size is 32.	

(c)

(d)

Figure 9: Output of TLB and Page Table testing. Searching entries in (a) empty page table, and (b) page table having valid entries. (c) Whole Page table with valid translation. (d) : Reverse mapping of page table.

For core1, nothing is enabled so all three bits would be cleared i.e. xxxxxxxd770 changes to xxxxxxxc370.



Figure 10: Output of CIU. No pending interrupt on core 1.

# 5.4.5. Output on Hypervisor Console

During execution, hypervisor makes a call to the code written for console I/O. On console attachment, the binaries, executing within hypervisor, can start printing on the hypervisor console. To validate virtual execution of binaries, hypervisor console output (e.g. shown in Figure 12) was compared with that of real host system console.

### 6.Impact on Project Progress

We faced unexpected performance challenges during this deliverable and had to put extra effort to meet the deadline. Fortunately, the project is on track now.



Figure 11: Output of CIU. No pending interrupt on core 0.

```
root@octeon:/home/Asad data/hypervisor2-clone# ./dist/Debug/GNU-Linux-x86/hypervisor2-clone
                            Loaded binary address...: 0x00000004b883000
REGION ADDR...: 0x00000002ba4c000 REGION SIZE = 0x80
REGION ADDR...: 0x00000002ba4d000 REGION SIZE = 0x200
REGION_ADDR...: 0x00000004bc83000 REGION_SIZE = 0x10000000
REGION ADDR...: 0x00000005bc83000 REGION SIZE = 0x80000
REGION ADDR...: 0x00000005bd03000 REGION SIZE = 0x80000
U-Boot 1.1.1 (Development build, svnversion: u-boot:exported, exec:exported) (Bu
BIST check passed.
Warning: Board descriptor tuple not found in eeprom, using defaults
EBH5610 board revision major:1, minor:0, serial #: unknown
OCTEON CN56XX-NSP pass 2.0, Core clock: 0 MHz, DDR clock: 0 MHz (0 Mhz data rate
DRAM: 1024 MB
Clearing DRAM..... done
Flash boot bus region not enabled, skipping NOR flash config
                  :
```

#### References

[1] Cavium Networks OCTEON Plus CN54/5/6/7XX, Hardware Reference Manual CN54/5/6/7XX-HM-2.4E, January 2009, chapter 14 (CIU).

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